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SECURITY FOR A COMMERCIAL LOAN: HISTORICAL &
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
EDWARD A. TOMLINSON*
Historians disagree about when the commercial and intellectual life
of Western Europe reached the nadir known as The Dark Ages. Did that
point arise with the collapse of the Roman Empire triggered by the Bar-
barian Invasions of the fifth century, or did it occur later with Arab ex-
pansion in the late seventh and early eighth centuries?' On the other
hand, most historians agree that by the twelfth century Europe was ex-
periencing a revival whose effects continued at least until the arrival of
the Black Death in the mid-fourteenth century.2 That revival featured the
appearance, first in the Italian city states and then throughout northern
Europe, of a substantial merchant class that developed trade networks ex-
tending from England in the north to the Crusader States in the east.
That economic revival was accompanied by an intellectual revival whose
hallmark was the study of Roman Law, primarily the Corpus Juris
Civilis of the sixth century Eastern Roman Emperor Justinian.
The feudal system in which these developments occurred was not
particularly responsive to the legal needs of merchant creditors. From a
modern perspective, the creditor's security derives primarily from the
availability of an effective legal system providing remedies for enforcing
the debtor's duty to pay. In most cases, the availability of effective legal
remedies provides the debtor with sufficient encouragement to pay when
due without any need for the creditor actually to sue. Remedies available
in feudal courts did not perform that function for merchant creditors.
Rather, those courts focused on resolving disputes over land, including
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. This paper was
presented at a March 1999 Conference of the Society of Ancient Near Eastern Law,
sponsored by John Hopkins University and the University of Maryland School of Law,
on Security for a Debt. A slightly revised version will appear with the other papers
presented at the Conference in Security For A Debt in Ancient Near Eastern Law, to be
published in 2000 by E.J. Brill, Leiden, the Netherlands. I would like to thank Stephen
Derby, Michael DeVinne, Andrew King, and William Reynolds for helpful comments on
earlier versions of this article.
1. The latter theory: espoused by the noted Belgian historian Henri Pirenne, has re-
ceived considerable criticism. See BRYCE LYON, THE ORIGINS OF THE MIDDLE AGES
(1972).
2. See CHARLES HOMER HASKINS, RENAISSANCE OF THE TWELFTH CENTURY (1933).
On the staying power of Haskins' work, see NORMAN F. CANTOR, THE INVENTING OF THE
MIDDLE AGES 245-77 (1991).
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the services which tenants holding land owed to their lords. The proce-'
dures utilized by the courts were slow and often involved primitive meth-
ods of proof (e.g., trial by battle or ordeal) that assumed God would in-
tervene to assist the righteous. Such a forum was not a propitious one for
a nonresident merchant contemplating a lawsuit to collect a debt. Moreo-
ver, feudal law viewed a man's body, as well as his lands, as belonging
to the lord. Therefore, it normally precluded the creditor from proceeding
against the debtor's person by imprisoning him and from seizing the
debtor's land to satisfy a judgment.'
A. Development of Creditors' Remedies in Medieval England
Creditors encountered similar problems in England despite that
country's lead in developing effective legal institutions. By the twelfth
century, the strong, centralized Anglo-Norman monarchy had created a
system of royal courts applying a new body of law common to the entire
kingdom. 4 One of the most significant remedies afforded by this new
body of common law was the action for debt, "a procedure for compel-
ling debtors to pay their obvious dues."' 5 However, the procedures in an
action for debt were cumbersome and allowed the debtor to escape liabil-
ity by waging his law, i.e., by recruiting from among his friends a certain
number of compurgators (in effect, character witnesses) who supplied
their oaths in support of the debtor's oath that he did not owe the
money.6 In addition, the common law courts gave the creditor no remedy
against the debtor's person. As explained by the leading historians of me-
dieval English law, the common law knew at the time "no process
whereby a man could pledge his body or liberty for payment of a debt." 7
3. See Jay Cohen, The History of Imprisonment for Debt and its Relation to the De-
velopment of Discharge in Bankruptcy, 3 J. LEGAL HIST. 153, 154 (1982). On imprison-
ment for debt, see notes 13 and 67 infra and accompanying text.
4. The medieval common law was indigenous to England; it remained largely unaf-
fected by Roman law. This situation contrasts sharply with the reception of a revived Ro-
man law by most continental legal systems. The standard explanation for this English ex-
ceptionalism is chronological, that is, the Anglo-Norman kings in the generations after the
Norman Conquest of 1066 developed their own legal system before the revival of Roman
law had occurred. On the Continent, on the other hand, effective legal institutions arrived
later at a time when Roman law was available as a model. See R.C. VAN CAENBGEM, AN
HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO PRIVATE LAW 3 (1992).
5. THEODORE F.T. PLuCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 363 (5th
ed. 1956) (hereinafter PLUCKNETr, CONCISE HISTORY).
6. Id. at 115-16.
7. II FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERICK WILLIAM MAITLAND, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 596 (1895). The situation on the Continent was less
clear. Pollock and Maitland suggest that imprisonment for debt was permissible through-
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The creditor could therefore proceed only against the debtor's property,
which in effect meant the debtor's personal property but not his land.
This limitation appeared in the common law writs of execution which al-
lowed the sheriff to seize the debtor's personal property to satisfy a judg-
ment, but did not allow the debtor's dispossession from land, the chief
source of wealth. The law treated the land as belonging to the debtor's
lord; at most, the sheriff could levy on the crops or other proceeds from
the land.8
The last three decades of the thirteenth century (the reign of King
Edward I) brought significant changes to English law on "the fundamen-
tal business of debt-collecting." 9 Change came in the form of statutes,
enacted by the newly inaugurated Parliament, which dealt harshly with
defaulting debtors. Parliament excused this severity in the preamble to
the first of these statutes (the Statute of Acton Burnett of 1283) on the
ground that foreign merchants would not do business in England unless
they were given a ready means for securing payment of their debts.'0
Plainly, the statute's drafters believed that a creditor's best security was
the availability of effective legal remedies against a debtor who did not
pay. Accordingly, the Statute of Acton Burnett, soon superseded in 1285
by the more comprehensive Statute of Merchants, gave the creditor three
significant procedural weapons.
The creditor's first procedural weapon was a system of debtor re-
cognizance. The Statute of Merchants required mayors to enroll debtors'
bonds under the royal seal in local borough courts; in these bonds, debt-
ors acknowledged their indebtedness. Creditors actively sought these re-
cognizances because they eliminated any need to bring an action for
debt; execution against the debtor, without any need for a trial or other
procedures, followed immediately upon the presentation to a court of a
bond in default.' For at least a century, the borough and fair or market
out the High Middle Ages in royal courts on the Continent. Id. The leading historian of
French private law seems to agree. See JEAN BRISSAUD, A HISTORY OF FRENCH PRIVATE
LAW 564-68 (1912). However, a French Ordinance of 1254, promulgated by Louis IX,
echoed feudal concerns by expressly forbidding royal seneschals and bailiffs from seizing
or holding the body of the debtor for a private debt. Id. at 568 n.2.
8. See PLUCKNETr, CONCISE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 390.
9. See THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, LEGISLATION OF EDWARD 1 137 (1947) (hereinaf-
ter, PLUCKNETr, LEGISLATION). Professor Plucknett mocks English conservatives who view
Edward I's reign as the golden age of the common law. In fact, it was a time of radical
legal change. See PLUCKNETr, CONCISE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 396-97.
10. See PLuCKNETr, LEGISLATION, supra note 9, at 139. The Statute of Acton Burnett
proved to be an interim one; in 1285, Parliament superseded its provisions by enacting
the Statute of Merchants.
11. Id. at 144.
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courts where these enrollments occurred had resolved commercial dis-
putes informally by applying merchant custom, but their territorial juris-
diction was limited, and they lacked power to enforce a judgment outside
the borough. This situation changed with the Statute of Merchants, which
authorized the royal courts to enforce summarily debtors' recognizances
enrolled in the borough and fair courts."2
To assure execution of these recognizances against debtors, the Stat-
ute of Merchants gave creditors, as a second procedural weapon, the
power to obtain from both the local and royal courts the immediate im-
prisonment of a debtor in default. The debtor's imprisonment had a coer-
cive impact; it was intended to encourage the debtor to gather his assets
together and to sell them to satisfy the debt. If the debtor did not satisfy
the debt within three months, creditors received, as a third procedural
weapon, the right to seize all the debtor's property, including both bor-
ough and feudal lands. Thus, the Statute of Merchants gave merchant
creditors a remedy that the common law had long refused, i.e., the ability
to control the debtor's land. Creditors became tenants or holders of the
land by "statute merchant" and no longer needed to rely on the often
uncooperative sheriff to collect the land's proceeds. In sum, these proce-
dural weapons made the creditor more secure by creating a legal system
which gave him "more chance of getting his money." 3
The borough, fair, and later staple courts did not outlast the Middle
Ages, but the royal or common law courts, which by the late fifteenth
century had acquired most of the kingdom's mercantile litigation, imple-
mented similar creditor friendly procedures. First, the Statue of Westmin-
ster II, enacted the same year as the Statute of Merchants (1285), al-
lowed a judgment creditor in the royal courts to hold one-half of the
debtor's land until the debt was satisfied. 14 Second, the royal courts,
starting in the thirteenth century, allowed creditors, before the creditor
actually parted with his money, to pursue to judgment an action for debt.
The Statute of Westminster II regularized this procedure by providing
that such a debt of record (also called a recognizance) was not subject to
further challenge.15 Third, and most importantly, Parliament authorized
12. In the fourteenth century Parliament established a similar machinery of debtor
recognizance in staple courts for the convenience of foreign merchants dealing in wool,
leather, and other staples. See PLucKNETr, CONCISE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 393.
13. See PLucKrTT, LEGISLATION, supra note 9, at 142. For the debtor's imprison-
ment, see id., at 142-43. For the creditor's tenancy by statute merchant, see PLUCKNETT,
CONCISE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 393.
14. See PLUCKNETr, CONCISE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 390-92.
15. Id. at 393-94. Summary judicial proceedings based on written instruments are
often unfair; the instrument may be a forgery. To give the debtor some protection, the
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the royal courts to imprison nonmerchant as well as merchant debtors.
The first such law, called by a leading historian of the common law
"one of the most drastic enactments in our history," authorized the royal
courts to imprison servants and bailiffs whose accounts were in arrears.
16
A 1352 law extended this power to all actions for debt but required the
creditor to choose between proceeding against the debtor's person (im-
prisoning the debtor to coerce him or his friends to satisfy the debt) or
against the debtor's property (seizing the debtor's property to satisfy the
debt). For centuries English law forced the creditor to make that choice. 17
It appears that the latter route was generally the more popular one.
B. Bankruptcy as a Creditor's Remedy
On the Continent, the legal changes which afforded the merchant
creditor greater security took a quite different form. Starting in the
twelfth century, the Italian city states developed their own legal systems
applying a mixture of merchant custom and revived Roman Law.' 8 Sub-
sequently, similar systems appeared in fair towns and free cities through-
out Europe. These new courts proceeded more informally and rapidly
than did the preexisting feudal courts. More import antly, they afforded
merchant creditors the potent remedy of "bankrupting" a defaulting
debtor. 19 This initiative came from the Italian cities, which by the late
thirteenth century had adopted statutes regulating bankruptcy proceedings.
Bankruptcy itself derived from Roman law, which had recognized a cred-
itor's right to initiate a proceeding against a defaulting debtor for the col-
lective execution and distribution of the debtor's assets.
20
The bankruptcy process, as it appeared in the medieval Italian city
states, was purely a creditor's remedy. Its purpose was to make creditors
common law during the fourteenth century developed the writ audita querela allowing the
debtor to present certain defenses. Id. The medieval recognizance nevertheless survives
today in those states of the United States which recognize the cognitive note in which the
debtor confesses judgment at the time he receives the loan. See D.H. Overmeyer Co., Inc.
v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972) (holding cognitive note enforceable between
merchants).
16. See PLucKNETT, CONCISE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 389.
17. Id. at 389.
18. HAROLD BERMAN, LAW AND REvOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LE-
GAL TRADITION 356-403 (1983).
19. The word "bankrupt" itself derives from the Italian "banco rotto," meaning
counter or business broken. See J. PERCEROU, DES FAILLITES, BANQUEROUTES ET LIQUIDA-
TIONS JUDICIAIRES 14 n.1 (2d ed. 1935).
20. On the history of bankruptcy, see PERCEROU, supra note 19, at 3-67; J. KOHLER,
LEHRBUCH DES KONKURSRECHT (1891); Louis EDWARD LEVINTHAL, The Early History of
Bankruptcy Law, 66 U. PA. L. REv. 223-50 (1919).
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more secure and not to give the debtor a fresh start nor to allow a failing
business to survive by reorganizing. These concerns, which often moti-
vate modem bankruptcy legislation, were absent from bankruptcy's early
history. Rather, the bankruptcy statutes of the Italian city states afforded
creditors an effective remedy against defaulting debtors. The mere stop-
page of payment by a merchant allowed creditors to secure the debtor's
arrest by the court. The creditors then elected a magistrate (later called a
referee or judge) who designated a curator (now generally called a trus-
tee) to collect and manage the debtor's assets. The liquidation which fol-
lowed was largely creditor-controlled, and the debtor received a discharge
only to the extent that creditors actually received payment. The debtor
thus remained liable for any unsatisfied debts. Finally, the court could
impose on a bankrupt person criminal penalties for any fraud or lesser
fault. Even if the court found that the debtor committed no crime, a de-
termination of bankruptcy was considered infamous, disqualifying the
bankrupt person from many occupations and offices.
Creditors no doubt hoped that the repressive nature of bankruptcy
proceedings would deter debtors from defaulting. For those debtors who
did default, imprisonment was available as a means to coerce payment,
as was the power of the referee to question the bankrupt under oath
about the location of his assets. The only aspect of the procedure
favorable to the debtor was the survival, alongside creditor-initiated
bankruptcy proceedings, of the Roman law institution of bonorum cessio.
That institution allowed the honest debtor to avoid bankruptcy by ac-
knowledging his own insolvency rather than fleeing or being forced into
bankruptcy by his creditors. The honest debtor could thus avoid the igno-
miny and imprisonment of bankruptcy if he turned over all his assets to
his creditors. The threat of punitive bankruptcy proceedings provided the
debtor with a strong incentive to cooperate with his creditors in this
fashion.2 1
Bankruptcy did not officially arrive in England until 1542 when Par-
liament enacted the first English bankruptcy statute.22 Earlier the borough
and fair courts had developed, as part of the law merchant, procedures
for the collective distribution of a defaulting debtor's assets,23 but these
courts had faded by the sixteenth century. Creditors found the common
law remedies inadequate and obtained from Parliament in 1542 a statute
directed "against such persons as do make Bankrupts." The statute's Pre-
amble complained that debtors had avoided payment by concealing their
21. On the bankruptcy statutes of the Italian city states, see PERCEROU, supra note
19, at 9-14 and Levinthal, supra note 20, at 241-44.
22. 34 and 35 Henry VIII, ch. 4 (1542).
23. v. SIR WiLLtAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 97-98.
[Vol. 23
SECURITY FOR A COMMERCIAL LOAN
assets, fleeing the country, or avoiding arrest by "keeping house" (i.e.,
by claiming their dwelling as a sanctuary). Parliament's initial response
to this problem was penal; it enacted a criminal statute that did little
more than punish debtors "who made very prodigal expenses and then
made off." 24
One might wonder how creditors could use the 1542 statute against
debtors whose dishonesty was less flagrant. To remedy that defect, Par-
liament developed more comprehensive bankruptcy procedures in subse-
quent statutes, principally ones enacted in 1570 and 1603. Under those
statutes, as on the Continent, only merchant debtors were subject to
bankruptcy. Commissioners, acting on behalf of the creditors, could im-
prison the debtor, seize his property, and examine persons (including the
bankrupt) believed to be concealing the debtor's property from creditors.
Finally, the creditors, acting under the commissioner's supervision, could
administer and ultimately distribute the debtor's assets on a rateable ba-
sis. As on the Continent, the debtor did not receive a discharge from un-
satisfied debts. That innovation did not come until a 1705 statute, and
then only applied to debtors whose bankruptcy was attributable to mis-
fortune. The earlier bankruptcy statutes had been. strictly punitive; they
sought to deter default by intimidating the debtor. For example, a 1623
statute provided that a debtor who failed to show that his bankruptcy was
due solely to misfortune was subject to the pillory and the loss of an
ear.
25
Bankruptcy entered French law by the Ordinance of 1673 (France's
initial commercial codification) and by the Code de Commerce enacted in
1807 under the First Empire. The latter statute, as proudly noted by the
leading French scholar on bankruptcy, has had a grand influence in Eu-
rope, "both by the strength of our armies and by its own merits." ' 26 Its
24. Louis Edward Levinthal, The Early History of English Bankruptcy, 67 U. PA. L.
REv. 1, 7 (1919). With Gallic aplomb, Professor Percerou castigates the 1542 English
statute as "very inferior." See PERCEROU, supra note 19, at 15 n.7.
25. On the English bankruptcy statutes, see Levinthal, supra note 24. The general
discharge provided by the 1705 statute was evidently intended as an interim measure oc-
casioned by the hardship generated by the War of the Spanish Succession. See xi HOLDS-
WORTH, supra note 23, at 445. Jay Cohen argues that the 1705 statute survived, even
though it gave merchant bankrupts a fresh start while nonmerchant debtors languished in
prison, because it responded to a felt need to provide honest business owners with some
form of limited liability. Owners can now limit their personal liability by doing business
in corporate form, but that alternative was not available in the eighteenth century. See Co-
hen, supra note 3.
26. See PERCEROU, supra note 19, at 36. Percerou is of course referring to Napo-
leon's armies, which in 1807 occupied most of Europe. Many of the occupied countries
adopted one or more of the Napoleonic Codes. The leading German authority on bank-
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merits most assuredly appealed to creditors, given the exceptional sever-
ity of its treatment of merchant debtors, the only debtors covered by the
Code. This hostility to debtors followed a number of spectacular business
failures which evidently displeased Napoleon. The Emperor did not find
severe enough the draft Code submitted to him for his approval upon his
return to France after meeting with Emperor Alexander of Russia at Til-
sit; Napoleon insisted (successfully, of course) that it be amended to re-
quire the automatic imprisonment of the bankrupt.27 In addition, the 1807
Code eliminated the Roman Law bonorum cessio, which had been codi-
fied in the 1673 Ordinance promulgated by Louis XIV. Under the 1807
Code, therefore, all bankruptcies were either criminal or at least infa-
mous, thus disqualifying the bankrupt from most trades and professions.
In addition, the creditors took charge of administering and distributing
the debtor's estate, and the bankrupt, unlike in England, did not receive a
discharge for unpaid debts.
The French experience under the 1807 Code demonstrates that se-
vere treatment of the bankrupt may not be the creditor's best security.
The problem seems to be that not all bankrupts are crooks, and that those
who are crooks are likely to dissipate most of their assets before their ar-
rest by the bankruptcy court. The limited statistics available suggest that
creditors rarely received anything close to full payment from the bank-
rupt's estate and that, at least until the French Parliament amended the
Code de Commerce in 1838 and again in 1889 to revive the Roman Law
bonorum cessio (now called judicial liquidation), there were more liqui-
dations through informal agreements between the debtor and his creditors
than there were bankruptcy proceedings. 28 As confirmed in Balzac's
novel Cisar Birotteau (first published in 1837): "There are as many liq-
uidations as bankruptcies in Paris. One thereby avoids the dishonor, the
judicial delays, the attorneys' fees, and the depreciation of goods. Every-
one believes that bankruptcy will produce less return than liquidation. '29
The Parliament responded, in 1838 and then definitively in 1889, by en-
acting new laws allowing insolvent debtors, who surrender their assets to
ruptcy acknowledges that it is indeed the French Code de Commerce which has served as
the source of modem German bankruptcy law. see KOHLER, supra note 20, at 51.
27. Id. at 36. Napoleon also believed that the law should provide only a modest al-
lowance for the bankrupt's wife, but Cambac6rs and other wiser heads prevailed on that
point.
28. See PERCEROU, supra note 19, at 43-48; ALFRED JAUFFRET, DROrT COMMERCIAL
nn0 ° 890-896, at 579-83 (Jacques Mestre ed. 20th ed. 1997).
29. HONOR DE BALZAC, HISTOIRE DE LA GRANDEUR ET DE LA DECADENCE DE CSAR
BIROTTEAu 309-10 (1972) (translated by myself with sentence order slightly changed). In
the novel Balzac placed the event described in 1819.
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the courts, to obtain the judicial liquidation of their assets without being
stigmatized as a bankrupt.
Modem bankruptcy laws further demonstrate the limitation of bank-
ruptcy as a security device for creditors. Take, for example, the federal
Bankruptcy Act, enacted in 1898, which provides a uniform law of bank-
ruptcy throughout the United States. Under that Act, the debtor may initi-
ate bankruptcy proceedings, may obtain a discharge for unpaid debts,
may escape imprisonment or any serious stigma, and may keep, subse-
quent to discharge, a considerable amount of exempt property, often in-
cluding a dwelling. Modem bankruptcy law plainly serves other interests,
which often conflict with the creditor's interest in security. It seeks to
give debtors, today viewed more as unfortunates than as crooks, a fresh
start, to protect employees and the tax collector, and, most importantly,
to allow failing businesses to survive through reorganization. Accom-
plishing those goals sometimes requires the sacrifice of creditor interests.
Often a failing business can survive only if the creditors agree to a sus-
pension or even a partial discharge of claims so that the business can
raise new funds and eventually pay off at least some of its prior debts.
Such reorganizations in bankruptcy are commonplace in the United
States.30 The situation is now similar in France where the objectives of
bankruptcy, as specified in the 1985 amendments to the French Bank-
ruptcy Code, include "the survival of the enterprise, the maintaining of
production and jobs, and the satisfaction of debts." Under this formula-
tion, creditors' interests take third (and last) place. 3'
C. Contemporary Security Devices
The problems described above encouraged nineteenth and twentieth
century creditors to seek more effective security for the payment of
debts. Three principal techniques have emerged in Western Europe and
the United States. First, the creditor's use of the debtor's real or personal
property as collateral for a loan. If the debtor defaults on the loan, the
creditor looks to the property for security. Second, the creditor's acquisi-
tion of more accurate information on the risk that his debtor will not re-
pay a loan. Acquisition of this information allows the creditor to secure
himself by choosing more intelligently to whom he loans money. Third,
the creditor's arranging with other creditors to share the risk of the
30. For an overview of contemporary federal bankruptcy law, see DAVID G. EPSTEIN,
DEBTOR CREDITOR LAW IN A NUTSHELL (5TH ED. 1995).
31. See JAUFFRET, supra note 28, n0 929, at 609-10. The present French Bankruptcy
Code, more properly called the Loi relative au redressement et liquidation judiciaires des
enterprises, appears as an Appendix to the Code de Commerce. As its title indicates, it
applies only to businesses.
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debtor's default so that each creditor assumes that portion of the risk he
is best able to evaluate and handle. This risk-sharing approach, widely
employed today in international trade through letter of credit transactions,
provides merchant sellers with a degree of security which their medieval
forbearers could never have imagined.
1. The Debtor's Property as Security
The use of a debtor's property as "collateral" or security for a loan
derives from the ancient legal transaction known as pledge. However, the
pledge, when it first appeared in early Germanic law, did not function as
a security device.32 Rather, it served as a provisional sale or, in the alter-
native, as a provisional method of payment. In the first case, the pledgor
pledged his property (usually goods) to obtain from the pledgee property
which he wished to purchase, while in the second case the pledgor
pledged his property to satisfy the pledgee's claim for some wrong com-
mitted by the pledgor. These transactions were in effect cash transactions;
not surprisingly, they occurred frequently in primitive societies that did
not have a fixed medium of exchange (what we call money).
In both cases, the pledgor gave the pledgee whatever property he
had available at the time of the transaction, with the understanding that
he could substitute more appropriate (or equivalent) property at a future
date. However, the pledged property did not serve as security for an un-
derlying debt. The pledgor had no obligation to reclaim it; if the pledgor
chose not do so, the pledgee simply became its new owner. More impor-
tantly, the pledgee had no obligation to account for any surplus nor any
right to obtain any deficiency, as he would have had if the pledged prop-
erty had served as security for an underlying debt. Those features, essen-
tial aspects of a security transaction, were absent from the original pledge
idea as found both on the Continent and in England. It was not until the
late Middle Ages (fourteenth century and later) that the Germanic legal
systems recognized that pledged property could serve as security for an
underlying debt. In that case, the creditor (the pledgee) was liable for any
surplus (the value of the property in excess of the debt) and could sue
the pledgee for any deficiency if the value of the property did not cover
the debt. In addition, if the debtor defaulted, the new law of pledge nor-
mally required the creditor to initiate a judicial or at least a public sale
of the pledged property; the creditor could not simply keep the property
32. On the history of pledge, see John H. Wigmore, The Pledge Idea: A Study in
Comparative Legal Ideas, 10 HARV. L. REV. 321 (1896); 10 HARV. L. REV. 389 (1897);
11 HARV. L. REV. 18 (1897). Professor Wigmore was one of the first great American
comparativists. His magisterial study on the pledge idea remains unsurpassed.
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by declaring a forfeiture.3
The use of the debtor's property as a security device was of limited
utility until the nineteenth century. The principal difficulty was the re-
quirement, applicable to pledges of personal property, that the creditor or
a neutral third person actually take possession of the pledged property.
No doubt a creditor is quite secure if he has possession of a debtor's
goods equal in value to the debt, but most debtors are not in a position
to offer that type of security. Would-be debtors normally seek credit to
purchase goods or operate a business; the credit is of no utility to the
debtor unless the debtor retains possession of the goods or business be-
cause the debtor expects to use them to generate profit. Despite the
debtor's need for possession, the civil law systems on the European Con-
tinent have generally followed Roman law in requiring the creditor to
take possession of pledged goods. This solution was codified in article
2076 of the Napoleonic Civil Code of 1804, which explicitly provided
that a creditor retained a security interest in the pledged property only as
long as the property remained in the possession of the creditor or of a
third person agreed to by the parties. That text remains in effect today.34
By mandating the debtor's dispossession, article 2076 assures that other
creditors or potential creditors of the debtor receive notice that the
pledged property is not available to satisfy any judgment they may obtain
against the debtor.35
English law took a similar approach in treating the debtor's posses-
sion of pledged property as a fraud on the debtor's other creditors. In a
well known 1601 decision, Twyne's Case, the Star Chamber allowed the
debtor's other creditors to avoid or set aside such a pledge on the
grounds that the secured creditor's allowing the debtor to remain in pos-
session of the pledged property was a fraudulent conveyance.36 As a re-
sult, the secured creditor lost his security interest in the property, an in-
terest which would have given him priority over other creditors in
enforcing his claim. Twyne's Case later became a lead precedent, cited on
33. Thus, on the Continent, the newly revived Roman law treated as unenforceable
forfeiture clauses (pacta commissoria) in security agreements. See RUDOLF HUEBNER, A
HISTORY OF GERMANIc PRIVATE LAW 452 (1918). Article 2078 of the French Civil Code
(enacted 1804) and article 1229 of the German Civil Code (enacted in 1896) codify this
Roman law prohibition. Id.
34. The German Civil Code of 1896 contained a similar provision in article 1265
which likewise remains in effect today. See also CODICE CIVILE Art. 2876 (Italy).
35. ALEx WEILL, DROrr CIVIL. LEs S&RET s. LA PUBLICITE FONCIERE NO 80, AT 82
(1979).
36. Twyne's Case, 3 Coke 806, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Chamber 1601). Sir Edward
Coke was the Attorney General who prosecuted and reported that case. He later became
one of England's greatest judges and legal scholars.
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both sides of the Atlantic as demonstrating the common law's abhorrence
of nonpossessory security interests. 37
This condemnation of "secret" liens did not apply, of course, if a
carrier or warehouse rather than the debtor possessed the goods. In such
cases, the common law readily recognized that documents of title (bills
of lading or warehouse receipts) could be used, not only to control
movement of the goods, but also to give the creditor a security interest in
the goods. In addition, the condemnation of secret liens also did not ap-
ply to pledges of land (i.e., mortgages) because, even though the debtor
remained in possession, the debtor's other creditors could receive notice
of the pledge through public land records. However, land often proved to
be an inadequate security device because the courts, particularly equity
courts, intervened to protect the debtor's interest in preserving the family
homestead or business. Thus, the creditor had to follow cumbersome pro-
cedures and wait many years before foreclosing a defaulting debtor's
right to redeem his ownership of the land by paying the debt.38 Creditors,
impatient to collect their money, needed a more timely and effective
remedy.
In nineteenth century America, the need for credit made intolerable
these common law restrictions on the use of the debtor's property as se-
curity. Manufacturers needed credit to buy goods (usually raw materials),
to operate factories which turned raw materials into finished products,
and to maintain an adequate inventory of goods for sale to their custom-
ers. Sellers and lenders responded by extending credit; those creditors
took what the debtor had to offer, i.e., a security interest in the actual
goods, machinery, or inventory. To protect the creditor's interest, creative
lawyers drafted documents called chattel mortgages, conditional sales
agreements, or trust receipts that purported to allow the creditor to seize
and sell the property if the debtor defaulted. Sometimes courts enforced
these contracts to give the secured creditor priority (at least with respect
to the pledged property) over the debtor's other creditors and sometimes
the courts did not. To achieve greater certainty, as creditors have no in-
terest in gambling on enforceability, their lawyers then turned to the leg-
islatures for relief in the form of statutes validating these new contracts.
Legislatures responded affirmatively by enacting laws recognizing chattel
mortgages, conditional sales, and other instruments creating nonposses-
37. 1 GRANT GiLMORE, SECURrTY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 2.5, at 39-47
(1965).
38. See PLUCKNETr, CONCISE HISTORY supra note 5, at 603-08 and 690. French law
also does not require the debtor's dispossession for real estate mortgages (hypoth ques),
but in France real estate rarely serves as security for debts other than those incurred by
buyers in purchasing the land.
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sory security interests in personal property. Under these laws, a central-
ized recording system gave both the debtor's other creditors, as well as
potential buyers from the debtor, legal notice of the creditor's security in-
terest in the debtor's property. That notice dissipated the suspicion of
fraud generated by the debtor's retention of possession. As a. result, the
secured creditor's interest in the property received priority over the inter-
ests of other creditors and of buyers. 39
The most widespread of these new security devices was the personal
property or chattel mortgage. By the early twentieth century, all forty-
eight states had enacted statutes validating the chattel mortgage. These
statutes favored the creditor by providing him with the remedy of self-
help. Upon the debtor's default, the creditor could seize and sell the
property without court intervention if he could obtain possession without
a breach of the peace and if he followed statutory procedures (mainly
giving notice) for a private or nonjudicial sale. While the creditor could
not simply declare the property forfeit, he could purchase it at the sale,
paying for it by forgiving all or part of the debt.4° While protective of
creditors, these statutes were popular because they served the interest of
both creditors and debtors. Creditors wanted security and debtors (at least
honest ones) wanted to be able to offer them security so that they could
more readily obtain a loan.
The chattel mortgage statutes also addressed, but did not fully re-
solve, the more difficult problem of enforcing a shifting or floating lien.
Goods in the debtor's possession do not remain static. Rather, the debtor
uses tools, machinery, and other equipment (all of which wear out and
eventually need replacing) to transform raw materials into finished prod-
ucts-goods which the debtor then maintains in inventory until sold to
customers and replaced by new finished products hot off the assembly
line. This constant processing and replacement of goods by the debtor
posed a real problem for the common law, which had always viewed a
creditor's lien as attaching to a specific piece of property. Upon that
property's transformation, the creditor's security interest disappeared.
Many merchant debtors therefore could not offer adequate security; the
goods they possessed changed daily. The lawyers' response to this prob-
lem was to create a floating lien which followed the debtor's property
through all these transformations. Specifically, this lien applied to prop-
erty acquired by the debtor after the creation of the creditor's security in-
39. On the history of security interests in personal property, see Grant Gilmore &
Allan Axelrod, Chattel Security 1, 57 YALE L. J. 517 (1948) and Grant Gilmore, Chattel
Security 11, 57 YALE L. J. 725 (1948).
40. See 2 GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS supra note 37, § 43.2, at 1184-90 and §
44.1, at 1211-16.
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terest and to proceeds from the sale of secured property. These innova-
tions received confirmation in the Uniform Trust Receipts Act drafted by
Professor Karl Llewellyn in the early 1930s. That model statute recog-
nized a new generic instrument, called a trust receipt, creating a security
interest in personal property which the creditor entrusted to his debtor.
41
The culmination of this historical development was the Uniform
Commercial Code, a statute drafted during the 1940s and enacted by
forty-nine of the fifty states by the late 1960s.42 Like the Uniform Trust
Receipts Act, the new Code was the product of a movement to make
more uniform the commercial law of the various states. The Code's draft-
ers, spearheaded by Professor Llewellyn, were an elite group of judges,
professors, and practicing lawyers joined together in the American Law
Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws; they presented their Code as a model for adoption by state
legislatures. State legislatures responded enthusiastically by adopting it
largely unchanged.
The Code itself covers the sale of goods (Article 2), negotiable in-
struments (Articles 3 and 4), and security interests in personal property
(Article 9).43 Those latter provisions codify all the advances made during
the prior century. In particular, they present a simplified and unified
structure for the creation of a security interest in personal property.
Under the Code, a single instrument (called a security agreement) re-
places the chattel mortgage and other instruments previously recognized
by the law. The creditor obtains a security interest in the debtor's per-
sonal property by means of the security agreement. Upon perfection of
that interest (usually obtained by recording the agreement), the creditor
obtains priority, at least with respect to the secured property, over the
debtor's other creditors and over most buyers from the debtor. Further-
more, the Code ratifies the creditor's self-help and private sale remedies
and preserves the floating lien by recognizing the creditor's secured inter-
est in proceeds and other after-acquired property of the debtor. Finally,
while the Code does not address what happens if the debtor goes bank-
rupt, federal bankruptcy law recognizes that secured creditors may en-
force their interests in secured property in bankruptcy. Even if the bank-
41. See Gilmore, Chattel Security II, 57 YALE L. J. at 761-65.
42. Louisiana remains a partial hold-out. Much of its private law derives from the
French Civil Code of 1804.
43. The American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws publish the Official Text of the Code. The fourteenth edition ap-
peared in 1995. Professor Grant Gilmore was the principal drafter of Article 9. For his
magisterial summary of its provisions, see 1 GILMORE, SECURrrY INTERESTS, supra note
37, at 287-400.
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ruptcy court orders the reorganization of the bankrupt, thus allowing the
bankrupt to keep his property, the creditor must receive a note promising
payment in full from the reorganized business.44 In sum, the creditor's se-
curity is considerable. No doubt the secured property may deteriorate in
value and there may be competing secured creditors, but secured credi-
tors who adequately monitor their debtors are likely to receive payment
in full.
Security interests in personal property have played a lessor role in
modem civil law systems. Civil Codes normally retain the traditional rule
that the creditor must acquire possession of the property to obtain an en-
forceable security interest. 45 In many civil law countries, nonpossessory
security interests in personal property play a minimal role.46 Other coun-
tries, such as France and Norway, have enacted special legislation recog-
nizing nonpossessory security interests in specific types of property used
for business purposes. 47 In France, a 1909 statute allows a creditor to ob-
tain a security interest in a debtor's fonds de commerce (trade name,
good will, leases, equipment) and a 1951 statute, intended to promote
post-war recovery, recognizes security interests more generally in a busi-
ness's tools and equipment.4 8 Both statutes give the secured creditor a
priority over the debtor's other creditors. However, no civil law system
appears to have adopted anything comparable to the unitary security in-
terest recognized by article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.49
On the other hand, civil law systems tend to provide the unpaid
seller with more generous protection than does the common law. For ex-
ample, an unpaid seller may, within generous limits, reclaim from a de-
faulting or even bankrupt buyer the goods sold. 50 In addition, in many
44. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(1994). This "full priority" afforded secured creditors
in bankruptcy is the subject of a lively debate among academics in the United States. See
Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured
Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L. J. 857 (1996) (arguing that full priority is economi-
cally inefficient).
45. See supra text accompanying note 34.
46. HARRY RAJAK, ED., EUROPEAN CORPORATE INSOLVENCY at 183-84 (Germany),
378-79 (Italy), and 574-75 (Spain) (2d ed. 1995).
47. Id. at 120-22 (France) and 487-88 (Norway).
48. Alfred Jauffret, La loi du 18 janvier 1951 sur le nantissement de l'outillage et
du materiel d'iquipement, 7 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL 202 (1954).
The 1909 statute presents the disadvantage that the debtor can only offer security to one
creditor. Id.
49. See PHILIP R. WOOD, COMPARATIVE LAW OF SECURHTY AND GUARANTIES (1995).
The closest analogy is the fiduciary trust recognized by case law in Germany and by the
1992 Civil Code in the Netherlands. Id. at 16-20. England and most other common law
countries recognize a unitary or universal floating lien. Id. at 11-12.
50. For example, the new Dutch Civil Code allows the unpaid seller to demand the
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civil law countries, the seller may include in the sales agreement a clause
retaining the seller's title in the goods sold until the buyer pays for them
in full. This retention of title clause creates a property and not just a se-
curity interest. This difference is significant because it allows the creditor
to withdraw the property from the debtor's estate not only before any
creditor claims are recognized but also before any reorganization of the
debtor. Thus, under the 1985 French Bankruptcy Law, unpaid sellers of
goods who retained title enjoy full priority, while the interests of secured
creditors are often sacrificed given the priority accorded by the new law
to reorganizing (and saving) the enterprise."
2. Information as a Security Device
Today, in the United States, over 1,100 credit reporting companies
supply creditors with information on the credit-worthiness of American
consumers.5 2 Creditors believe it worthwhile to purchase this information
because it allows them to reduce their risks by declining to loan money
to persons with poor credit ratings. In addition, the credit rating system
gives creditors increased leverage in collecting existing debts. Many a
debtor scrambles to pay when told by the creditor that a bad credit rating
provoked by default will foreclose the debtor's access to future credit.
The focus of the contemporary credit reporting industry is the consumer
debtor, but when the industry first appeared in the 1840s, its purpose was
to provide creditors with information on potential merchant debtors.
Business in early nineteenth century America operated on a sea or
web of credit.53 Indeed, one could say that America had been founded on
credit, as the majority of the early white settlers obtained their transatlan-
tic passage on credit by agreeing to work as indentured servants for four
to seven years after their arrival. 54 Even after American independence the
return of the goods within six weeks after the debt has become due or sixty days after
delivery. See RAJAK, supra note 46, at 456-57.
51. See supra text at note 31. One leading international practitioner goes as far as to
say that in insolvency proceedings in France "security must be regarded as virtually
worthless or at least highly unpredictable." See WOOD, supra note 49, at 159.
52. ELIzABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, ThE LAW OF DEBTORS AND
CREDITORS 8-14 (3rd ed. 1996).
53. LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 267 (2d ed. 1985) ("sea of
credit"); 1 ALFRED KONESFKY & ANDREW J. KING, EDS., LEGAL PAPERS OF DANIEL WEB-
STER 89 (1982) ("web of credit").
54. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 53, at 82-85. At least in theory, these settlers were
"free-willers" who had voluntarily agreed to work in return for their passage. In the sev-
enteenth and early eighteenth century most of the northern colonies also enforced inden-
tures for labor; a debtor in default could escape prison by agreeing to work under an in-
denture for a set number of years. PETER J. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN
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chronic shortage of currency made the granting of credit inevitable. For-
eign merchants sold goods on credit to American importers; importers or
wholesalers in the large Eastern seaboard cities sold goods on credit to
"country merchants" or retailers in the interior; and retailers then sold
goods on credit to their consumer customers.5 5 Both the foreign merchant
and the Eastern city wholesale merchant or "jobber" primarily relied for
security on the development of long-standing relationships with particular
importers or retailers. In other words, they extended credit to persons
whose prior record of trustworthiness made it likely that they would re-
pay the loan. A few of the larger firms hired investigators to obtain in-
formation on strangers seeking credit, but most merchants found that op-
tion too expensive. In addition, some creditors solicited letters of
recommendation from prospective debtors, but often those letters proved
to be untrustworthy. 6
Starting in the 1830s, at least two factors seriously undermined the
security of the wholesale merchant. First, the construction of canals and
railroads greatly expanded the market area in the interior of the United
States. More and more country or retail merchants who were unknown to
the wholesale merchants presented themselves at the latters' showrooms.
Thus, America's rapid expansion made the creditor's personal knowledge
an inadequate basis for deciding whether to grant credit.5 7 Second, an ac-
centuated cycle of booms followed by busts made it likely that, in the
hard times following a bust, some debtors who had always paid on time
in the past would be forced to default. A debtor's past record on pay-
ment therefore no longer provided adequate security for a new loan. The
Panic of 1837 proved to be a particularly severe bust, forcing many hon-
est merchants to default on their debts.58
The credit reporting industry originated in the 1840s as a response
to the growing need of wholesale merchants for more up-to-date informa-
tion on the credit-worthiness of retail merchants seeking credit. Its
founder-Lewis Tappan-was a true American original. Tappan's career
exemplifies de Tocqueville's contemporaneous observation that America
AMERICA: INSOLVENCY, IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT, AND BANKRUPTCY 1607-1900 251
(1974).
55. JAMES P. NORRIS, R.C. DUN & Co. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CREDIT REPORTING IN
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 3-4 (1978).
56. Bertram Wyatt-Brown, God and Dun & Bradstreet, 40 Bus. HIST. REV. 432,
436-37 (1966).
57. James H. Madison, The Evolution of Commercial Credit Reporting Agencies in
Nineteenth Century America, 48 Bus. HIST. REv. 164, 166 (1974).
58. BERTRAM WYATT-BROWN, LEWIS TAPPAN AND THE EVANGELICAL WAR AGAINST
SLAVERY 174-75 (1969) (suspension of payments by Arthur Tappan & Co.).
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was a nation of joiners. 59 A militant opponent of slavery and an outspo-
ken Evangelical Christian, Tappan was, in the words of his biographer, a
member of "any and every league that had been founded for almost any
purpose whatsoever, as long as it was benevolent, pious, and teetotal-
ing.'6° Tappan also pursued several business careers and was a partner in
his brother's silk goods wholesale business in New York when the Panic
of 1837 struck, forcing that business to suspend payments for a time af-
ter its own debtors defaulted.61
Tappan's business experience led him to found in 1841 the Mercan-
tile Agency, the world's first credit reporting firm. 62 To obtain up-to-date
information on the credit-worthiness of the country merchants now arriv-
ing in droves in New York and other Eastern cities, Tappan retained as
"correspondents" hundreds of lawyers and bankers living in the interior.
Abraham Lincoln, then an aspiring young lawyer in Illinois, served as
one of Tappan's early correspondents. These correspondents were charged
with the responsibility of making inquiries on the retail merchants in
their community and of presenting written reports to the Mercantile
Agency in New York. As demonstrated by the following credit report,
Tappan encouraged his correspondents to include information on the
merchant's personal life and morality: 63
James Samson is a peddler, aged 30; he comes to Albany to buy
his goods, and then peddles them out along the canal from Al-
bany to Buffalo. He is worth $2,000; owns a wooden house at
Lockport . . . has a wife and three children . . . drinks two
glasses cider brandy, plain, morning and evening-never more;
drinks water after each; chews fine cut; never smokes; good teeth
generally; has lost a large double tooth on lower jaw, back, sec-
ond from throat on left side . . . purchases principally jewelry
and fancy articles.
At least initially, Tappan did not pay his correspondents for their re-
ports but promised them that, in return for their services, he would assure
59. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA.
60. See WYATT-BROWN, supra note 58, at vii. Wyatt-Brown is paraphrasing Henry
James' classic portrayal of the antislavery lady, Miss Birdseye. See HENRY JAMES, THE
BOSTONIANS 27 (1956).
61. See WYATT-BROWN, supra note 58.
62. On the history of the Mercantile Agency, see WYATT-BROWN, supra note 58, at
229-47; see also Bertram Wyatt-Brown, God and Dun & Bradstreet, 40 Bus. HIST., REV.
at 432-50 (1966).
63. See WYATr-BROWN, supra note 58, at 235.
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the referral to them of debt collection work. Tappan compiled the corre-
spondents' reports in ledger books which were accessible to merchants
who had subscribed to his service by paying an annual fee. By the late
1840s, the Mercantile Agency had over seven hundred correspondents
and nearly eight thousand merchant subscribers. This remarkable growth
occurred even though Tappan's well known Abolitionist views made it
difficult for him to recruit correspondents in slave states and even though
Tappan himself refused any dealings with distilleries or other businesses
he considered to be immoral.
By the end of the nineteenth century, commercial credit reporting
agencies had evolved from a novel enterprise to an established business
institution. 64 Tappan's original Mercantile Agency eventually became the
well-known firm of Dun & Bradstreet. Over time, paid employees re-
placed the network of unpaid correspondents, and printed reference books
and weekly updates replaced the ledger books inspected at the credit
agency's office. The arrival of the telegraph made practicable the more
rapid dissemination of up-to-date information. These innovations allowed
Dun & Bradstreet and other credit reporting agencies to give subscribing
merchants speedy access to the up-to-date credit information they needed
about their customers.
Credit reporting services thrived in nineteenth century America be-
cause, once a merchant extended unsecured credit, the means to assure
payment were often woefully inadequate. In the absence of a federal
Bankruptcy Act,65 the law of debtor and creditor remained a state con-
cern. Not surprisingly, given the continuing cycle of booms followed by
busts, the matter of debtor relief often became a hot political issue. Since
debtors outnumbered creditors, many state legislatures found debtor relief
politically irresistible. 66 Most state legislation therefore favored debtors.
By the Civil War, most states legislatures had abolished imprisonment for
debt, thus depriving the creditor of a means for coercing his debtor to
pay. In addition, Homestead Acts, enacted in most western and southern
states, exempted the debtor's real property from execution. As in the feu-
dal system of the Middle Ages, it was not possible for the creditor to sat-
isfy a judgment by attaching the debtor's land, often the principal asset
available. Finally, numerous state insolvency acts gave debtors a delay in
payment or even a discharge from their debts. These statutes afforded
64. Madison, supra note 57, at 186.
65. Congress enacted Bankruptcy Acts in 1800, 1841, and 1867, but each of those
laws was quickly repealed. An 1898 Bankruptcy Act proved to be more permanent; al-
though much amended, it remains in effect today. See CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN
UNITED STATES HISTORY 1935.
66. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 53, at 246.
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debtors relief without providing creditors the advantages traditionally as-
sociated with bankruptcy proceedings. Creditors could not, as they could
in bankruptcy, initiate a collective, inquisitorial-type proceeding designed
to assemble and then distribute all the debtor's assets. 67
Creditors fought back against this wave of debtor relief legislation.
Usually, they found the courts more responsive to their concerns than
state legislatures. Federal courts, for example, held unconstitutional state
insolvency statutes that purported to discharge debts incurred before the
date of their enactment. 68 Courts also tended to enforce the new security
interests in personal property created by creditors' lawyers-the chattel
mortgage and conditional sales agreements discussed in the prior section.
Finally, state legislatures themselves often proved responsive to creditor
interests if those interests corresponded with broader public interests. For
example, legislatures enacted statutes giving mechanics and other artisans
a lien on real property for improvements for which they had not been
paid. In addition, state legislatures made debt recovery easier by enacting
statutes which gave all persons better access to the courts and which sim-
plified the often archaic common law procedures for debt collection. In
particular, new statutes allowed judgment creditors to "garnish" money,
wages, or goods owed the debtor by third persons.69 These reforms pre-
saged the enactment in the twentieth century of legislation such as the
Uniform Commercial Code which sought to balance more equitably
debtor and creditor interests.
3. Spreading Risk as a Security Device: Sureties and
Letters of Credit
A creditor can reduce the risk of a debtor's nonpayment by securing
promises from third parties to pay the debt if the debtor does not. Those
third party promisors, known as guarantors or sureties, are familiar
figures on the contemporary legal scene. As in Roman law, their liability
is normally secondary or accessorial in that the creditor can demand that
they pay the debt only if the principal debtor has refused to pay.70 Sure-
67. For these debtor relief measures, see Id. at 245-48, 269-75; see also COLEMAN,
supra note 54, at 249-60.
68. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 122 (1819) (holding such laws vio-
lated the federal constitutional prohibition on impairing the obligation of contract).
69. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 53, at 243-45; see also COLEMAN, supra note 53, at
262-68.
70. William H. Loyd, The Surety, 66 U. PA. L. REv. 40 (1917) (describing the his-
tory of surety at common law); see also WEILL, supra note 35, ch. 7 at 32 (see especially
Footnote 26, describing accessorial liability of surety or caution under present French
Civil Code); see also Arts. 765-78 BGB (German Civil Code) (see especially Art. 771 on
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ties nevertheless provide a creditor with considerable security, particu-
larly if chosen for that role on account of their financial solvency. The
creditor knows that he has recourse against a party of unquestioned sol-
vency if the debtor defaults. However, commercial sureties expect a fee
for their services and will not guarantee a debt unless they feel secure
that they will be able to enforce against the debtor their own claim for
reimbursement of any payments made to the creditor. Commercial sure-
ties are therefore not likely to be available if the debtor is unable to pro-
vide them with security. Sureties remain useful in spreading the risk for
the creditor, but they do not create security where none exists.
In early Germanic law, the surety played a more independent role.
Custom often expected that relatives, friends, patrons, and even lords
would fulfill the role of surety. That role was an onerous one because the
creditor could hold the surety hostage until the debt was satisfied. In-
deed, custom required obligors to provide hostages (pledges) 71 on all
sorts of occasions, e.g., to guarantee the payment of a debt, an appear-
ance in court, the execution of a judgment, or the preservation of the
peace. Unlike Roman and modem law, early Germanic law normally
treated the surety's or pledgor's obligation as primary if not exclusive.
The creditor thus looked to the surety for payment and often had no fur-
ther remedy against the debtor once he took a surety hostage. Holding
the surety hostage was a means of putting pressure on the debtor, as it
was assumed that the surety would do everything possible to convince
the debtor to pay. By the twelfth century, the practice of the creditor's
taking a surety hostage seemed to have disappeared, perhaps because
creditors balked at the cost of feeding hostages. As the old adage goes,
"The banquet of a hostage is a costly banquet." Suretyship, at least in
England, became a contract, one of the few consensual contracts the
common law enforced. However, until the end of the Middle Ages, the
surety's liability remained primary and sureties were not usually commer-
cial entities but rather individuals with personal ties to the debtor.72
In the modem commercial world, the documentary sale under a let-
ter of credit is the paradigmatic device utilized to provide security by
spreading the creditor's risk.73 Take the case of a merchant seller in
the guarantor's secondary liability).
71. In early medieval times a "pledge" (plegius) was almost always a person, not a
thing. see PLtuCKNETT, CONCISE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 603 n.2.
72. On the surety in early Germanic law, see BRISSAUD, supra note 7, at 571-74 and
II POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra n.7, at 191. For the banquet quotation, see BRISSAUD at
572-73. For the primary liability of the medieval surety, see Loyd, supra note 69, at 50-
51.
73. On the letter of credit, see JOHN F. DOLAN, THE LAW OF LETTERS OF CREDIT.
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country A desiring to sell goods to a merchant buyer in country B. Mod-
em communications permit the parties to agree on a sale without leaving
their respective countries and before the seller ships the goods. However,
the buyer is unlikely to want to pay for the goods until he obtains con-
trol over them in country B, and the seller is unlikely to agree to ship
the goods until assured of payment. Shipping on credit is simply too
risky for the seller even if the buyer has agreed to pay on delivery. The
buyer may be unable to pay on account of insolvency or may reject de-
livery of the goods because the buyer no longer wants them or believes
them to be nonconforming. Given the distance between the two coun-
tries, the seller may have no means of obtaining adequate information
about the buyer to ascertain whether these problems are likely to occur.
In addition, the seller may feel quite uncomfortable about pursuing legal
remedies against the buyer in the unfamiliar legal system of country B,
the forum where any dispute between the buyer and an unpaid seller is
likely to be resolved.
The irrevocable letter of credit responds to the seller's insecurity
about shipping on credit. It does so by expanding the transaction between
the seller and buyer to include the buyer's bank, the seller's bank, the
carrier, and the insurer of the goods. Each of these parties assumes, for a
fee, some of the risk that the seller would otherwise bear. To simplify a
good deal, the buyer obtains from his bank in country B an irrevocable
letter of credit payable to the seller for the purchase price of the goods.
While irrevocable, the credit is only payable when the issuing bank re-
ceives from the seller a bill of lading confirming the seller's shipment of
the goods. That bank, located in country B, naturally has better access to
information about the buyer than does the seller; it also has greater fa-
miliarity with the legal system of country B. The buyer's bank therefore
makes its own contractual arrangements with the buyer (usually called
the applicant) for payment of the sum designated in the letter of credit.
The bank is usually willing to extend credit to the buyer as long as the
bank retains the bill of lading because that document of title gives the
bank a security interest which the bank may enforce against the goods if
the buyer does not pay the bank.
COMMERCIAL AND STANDBY CREDITS (rev. ed. 1996) (American law); see also JEAN
STOUFFLET, LE CREDIT DOCUMENTAIRE - ETUDE JURIDIQUE D'UN INSTRUMENT FINANCIER
Du COMMERCE INTERNATIONALE (1957) (French law and international practice); see also
BORIS KOZOLCHYK, LETTERS OF CREDIT (1979) (comparative study) (Professor
Kozolchyk's book is part of the International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law). For a
marvelously clear, albeit simplified, presentation on letters of credit, see RALPH H. FOL-
SOM ET. AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS IN A NUTSHELL 140-50 (5th ed.
1996).
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The buyer, of course, needs the bill of lading to obtain delivery of
the goods. Prior to releasing the bill of lading to the buyer, the buyer's
bank normally expects either payment or the execution of another instru-
ment giving the bank a security interest in the goods. In the United
States, that instrument used to be the trust receipt, which has now been
subsumed under the unitary security agreement recognized by the Uni-
form Commercial Code. The trust receipt allowed the buyer to process or
even sell the goods without the entrusting party (the bank) losing its se-
curity interest. The buyer could therefore use the goods to make the
money which he needed to pay the bank.74
The international letter of credit, however, primarily benefits the
seller. Remember that the seller does not ship (i.e., deliver the goods to a
carrier in return for a bill of lading) until the seller obtains an irrevocable
letter of credit. That letter makes the buyer's bank the primary debtor,
thus providing the seller with additional security before he ships. Banks
do occasionally fail, but they are more likely than merchant buyers to be
solvent and to pay their debts on time. In addition, most sellers obtain a
confirmation of the letter of credit by a bank in their own country (coun-
try A). By confirming the letter of credit, the seller's bank becomes the
primary debtor. The seller's bank is better able than the seller to inform
itself about the banking system in country B and about the risk of default
by the buyer's bank. The seller's primary security when he parts with the
goods is therefore the confirmation by his bank of the letter of credit is-
sued by the buyer's bank. While it is conceivable that the seller's bank
could become insolvent and not pay (letters of credit are not insured by
the government, as are savings deposit in the United States), that risk is
one that most sellers feel comfortable about appraising and handling.
The letter of credit also assures that the seller receives prompt pay-
ment for the goods. There is a time gap between the seller's shipment
and payment. The seller must ship first, but once he ships he can submit
the bill of lading, proof of insurance, export license, and other required
documents to his bank to obtain payment under the letter of credit. In
other words, the seller receives payment before the buyer receives the
goods because both the seller's bank and then the buyer's bank honor the
letter of credit upon presentation of the documents submitted by the
seller. Of course, the banks and other intermediaries all receive a fee for
their services and any early payment received by the seller is always dis-
counted to take into account the time value of money. For this reason,
74. See KOZOLCHYK, supra note 73, at 61-66 (describing the more limited security
devices available to the buyer's bank in other countries). Professor Kozolchyk's compre-
hensive analysis confirms the superiority of the Uniform Commercial Code in recognizing
security interests in personal property.
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sellers and buyers who know and trust each other often do not go to the
trouble of including a letter of credit as the payment term for a sale.
Thus, most sales within one country and many sales within the European
Union do not involve letters of credit. Under those circumstances, a
seller desirous of obtaining security before shipping may feel sufficiently
comfortable if he simply retains a security interest in the goods. 75 That
technique is less likely to prove effective when the buyer is in a distant
country with a different legal system.
The letters of credit transaction described above originated in mid-
nineteenth century England. Largely the creation of the London banks, it
depends for its operation on the existence of functioning banking systems
in both country A and country B. It also requires currency convertibility
and cooperation between banks at the international level. Mercantile in-
terests have insured that cooperation has occurred. In most countries,
however, the law on letters of credit remains largely customary.76 Com-
mencing in 1929, the International Chamber of Commerce headquartered
in Paris has acted to standardize practices by issuing Uniform Customs
and Practice (UCP) for Documentary Credits. The most recent revision
dates from 1993. 77 The UCP rules are not mandatory, but most sales
agreements providing for payment by letter of credit incorporate them by
reference. In the United States, on the other hand, legislatures have inter-
vened, and Article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code, adopted in all
fifty states, provides rules on letters of credit. Once again, most of these
rules are not mandatory but apply only if the parties do not provide oth-
erwise by agreement. Both the UCP and the Code rules seek to insure
that the seller receives payment upon presentation of facially adequate
documents. Any dispute between the buyer and the seller over the quality
of the goods or other matters must be resolved later, most likely in a
lawsuit brought by the buyer in the seller's home forum.
D. Conclusion
There is one security device-potentially a very effective one-
which the Anglo-American common law has, fortunately, almost never
adopted: debt slavery. The common law did at one time authorize courts,
at a creditor's behest, to imprison debtors, but the purpose of the impris-
onment was coercive, i.e., to pressure the debtor to disclose his assets or
the debtor's family and friends to come to his aid. The debtor could not
be forced to work, and, in most jurisdictions, the creditor was responsible
75. See Id., at 1-2.
76. See DOLAN, supra note 73, 3.05, at 3-22.
77. Id. at 12-19.
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for paying for the debtor's upkeep. Debtors' prison was therefore not
debt slavery. Even if a debtor agreed to work for his creditor to pay off a
debt, the courts normally refused to enforce the agreement. No doubt co-
lonial courts did enforce some indentures for service,78 but the Supreme
Court decisively condemned debt slavery in The Peonage Cases in the
early twentieth century. In those cases, the Court found unconstitutional,
under the 1866 constitutional amendment abolishing slavery, efforts by
Southern states to require poor Blacks to work for landowners to whom
they were indebted.7 9
The lesson of The Peonage Cases is that there are limits on the se-
curity which a creditor can expect from the law. A debtor is a human be-
ing, and the common law has traditionally imposed limits on an individ-
ual's power to renounce the autonomy which is a hallmark of that
humanity. As recognized by John Stuart Mill, voluntary slavery is an ox-
ymoron. One cannot be free not to be free. Therefore, an agreement by
which a person would sell himself as a slave is null and void.80 This bed-
rock proposition receives little confirmation from statutes or reported
cases, perhaps because it is so basic that no one challenges it. Mill's
value judgment nevertheless pervades our legal system and makes it un-
likely that The Peonage Cases will arise again. Creditors may be a bit
less secure as a result, but we are a better society for it.
78. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
79. See United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 233 (1914). For a fascinating discussion
of the cases, see Benno L. Schmidt, Jr., Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and
Race in the Progressivie Era. Part 2: The Peonage Cases, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 646 (1982).
80. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY, IN THREE ESSAYS 125 (Oxford University Press
ed. 1912).
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